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Chapter pages in book: (p. 44 - 48)the war, construction costs rose significantly more than costs of other
types of output; androsemore for home construction than for commercial
and factory construction. The main cause lay in more rapid increases in
prices of building materials, particularly of lumber, than Of semi-manu-
factured goods generally. The result was that the prices of houses increased
more rapidly than the prices of consumer goods generally, and certainly
of consumer durable goods. Thus, a considerable part of the impact of
the federal housing credit programs after 1946 was raising the costs of
residential construction and the prices of homes above what would other-
wise have prevailed.
Some other effects of federal credit aids to housing from the thirties to
the fifties were: promotion of a decrease in the average size of homes and
in the number of rooms per home, a trend in keeping with urbanization
and the decline in average family size up to World War II; second, stimu-
lation of multi-unit projects developed on a cooperative ownership basis;
and third, increases in the scale of operation of home building enterprises,
which raised production efficiency.
Effects on Credit Markets and Lending Practices
Federal credit aids have modified the markets, practices, and economic
functions of the private financial system in profound and enduring ways.
Indeed, it seems probable that the institutional effects of federal credit
programs have been more important than their effect either on aggregate
economic activity or on allocation of resources.
In agriculture, federal credit aids lengthened maturities, liberalized
terms of credit, and tended to increase the size of the average farm mort-
gage loan. They also worked toward greater uniformity in both mortgage
and production credit costs throughout the nation, bringing the largest
relative reductions in the costs of farm credit in the South and West.
Federal Land Banks functioned as leaders in farm mortgage markets, set-
ting terms and conditions that private lenders were compelled to meet if
they were to retain their positions in the market. To a lesser degree, the
production credit associations have likewise been. aggressive market
leaders in the field of production credit, encroaching upon the markets
formerly served exclusively by nongovernmental lenders. In part, com-
mercial banks and life insurance companies have yielded market position
to the publicly sponsored agencies; in part, however, they have met the
increasingly liberal terms with loans carrying lower interest charges and
longer maturities. These effects of federal lending on farm credit markets
occurred mainly during a long period of decline in the structure of interest
44rates. In an economic environment marked by a stable or rising structure
of investment returns, the results might have been quite different.
In the sector of finance,federalcredit programs performed dramatic
rescue operations in the 1930's. They were used to maintain and
strengthen conmiercial banks and life insurance companies during periods
of severe economic strain. Notable in this role was the RFC bank loan
and capital programs of 1932—34. These loans were of two types: "confi-
dence" loans to active banks to enable them to keep open; and liquidation
loans to closed banks to facilitate an early discharge of their depositor
claims. In the year following February 1932, RFC authorized 10,178 to
6,100 banks and trust companies, disbursing $1 billion during this period,
and investing another $1.2 billion in the preferred stock of 6,104 banks.
Federal credit programs exerted a net expansive influence on the mar-
kets for private institutions, thereby increasing their earning power, equity
investment, and financial strength. Federal credit agencies helped private
financing institutions through direct loans, and by relieving them of unde-
sirable or illiquid assets. By injecting credit into the economy at numerous
points, federal agencies raised the level of production and the demand for
private credit. Federal assistance to agriculture and housing indirectly
created new demands for loans by business firms from private financial
companies. For example, federal financing of farmers enlarged the credit
demands of food processors; and federal credit for home construction
created needs for private bank loans among building contractors and
building material and equipment manufacturers.
But it is also true that federal credit activities in certain respects com-
peted with and restricted the markets of banks and other private financial
institutions. In the field of business credit, they made relatively high-risk
loans at rates less than those necessary to cover the full costs of such
operations. Credit is a highly differentiated commodity, and borrowers
are not influenced to select one rather than another lender merely by
comparing nominal rates of interest. Competition in credit consists not
only in the lower interest rates, but in more favorable repayment terms,
longer maturities, and in ancillary services offered to borrowers.
Public agencies tend to standardize their charges, irrespective of the
size, tenn to maturity, risk, or administrative cost involved in a business
loan. Standard terms tend to make federal agencies the most attractive
sources of credit to borrowers to whom private institutions can advance
funds only at comparatively high interest rates and on closely restricted
terms. It is in the high-risk segment of the credit market that federal loan
45agencies have cut most deeply into the potential loan markets of banks. To
minimize this kind of competition would require (1) changes in public
policy permitting banks to take longer risks and to charge commensurately
higher interest rates; and (2) closer gearing of federal loan and loan
guarantee charges to actual risks and costs, with abandonment of a stand-
ard loan rate.
Federal business credit programs have used amortized term loans exten-
sively, thus promoting the use of this kind of credit by commercial banks
in place of the traditional short-term, single payment, promissory note
that was often paid up annually and renewed by the business borrower.
This change stemmed largely from participation loan programs in the
mid-thirties, in which commercial banks made term loans jointly with the
RFC or with Federal Reserve Banks.
Medium and long-term export credits, first introduced by the Export-
Import Bank, have now filtered into the private credit pattern.
The Veterans' Administration pioneered in sponsoring the use of amor-
tized term loans for new and very small enterprises. Many commercial
bankers learned how to make these small business term loans safely and
profitably.
The authors add: "Federal agencies have performed in the field of
business credit an economic function similar to that discharged by them
in the field of housing credit. They have tended to lengthen the maturities
Of loans and to broaden the use of the amortized loan. In this respect, they
fostered an adjustment in the nature of business credit responsive to the
increasing use of durable producers goods by business enterprise in the
American economy. The term-lending principle has brought commercial
banks new problems of portfolio management and of liquidity mainte-
nance; but undoubtedly it has helped business enterprises by relating
repayments to earning power."
In housing, federal agencies seem to have achieved their objective of
reducing the costs of home mortgage credit by exerting a persistent down-
ward pressure on mortgage loan rates charged on conventional financing.
Yet on closer examination it appears that the major influence may have
been the long-term decline of the whole interest rate structure.
Home mortgage debt grew only moderately in the years 1934 through
1951 and at a lesser rate than consumer credit. But the insured portion
of the home mortgage debt increased substantially, to about 43 per cent
of the total at the end of 1953. When the influence of federal guarantees
and insurance on the volume of nonfarm home mortgage debt is: tested by
comparing the movement of such debt with the movement of consumer
installment sales credit, it is found that between 1935 and 1941, and
46again in the postwar years, uninsured installment sales credit rose more
rapidly. Further, federal loan insurance has not much influenced the dis-
tribution of mortgage lending among types of institutions. This is demon-
strated by the 'rather minor shifts since 1935 in the relative positions of
commercial banks, mutual savings banks, life insurance companies, and
savings and loan associations.
In conclusion, federal housing credit programs have displayed, during
a long period of falling interest rates, a pervasive tendency to reduce the
costs of credit to borrowers, to decrease regional differences in mortgage
loan rates, to increase the ratio of debt to equity, to lengthen the final
maturities of loans, and to promote the principle of periodic amortization
of loans (Table 10). Thus, they have tended on the whole to cause private
lending agencies to liberalize their credit terms and to readjust their
credit practices.
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